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COMMENTS
KASSOUF—THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S
MISGUIDED ATTEMPT TO REIN IN THE
IRS
BRIAN VALCARCE*
The omnibus clause of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) is a catch-all provision that
broadly punishes people who corruptly endeavor to obstruct administration
of the Internal Revenue Code. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Kassouf,
improperly limited conviction under the omnibus clause to cases where the
defendant had knowledge of a pending IRS investigation (a nexus test). The
Sixth Circuit is the only circuit today applying this rule, with most others
expressly or impliedly rejecting it.
Even though the Sixth Circuit is an outlier in applying a nexus test, there
has been pervasive discussion of the issue recently. There has been a
significant increase in circuit court decisions with some judges and
commentators staunchly opposing the majority view. Those in opposition to
the majority argue that a nexus test is necessary to limit the IRS from abusing
a statute that could expand to criminalizing any wrong act in a tax setting as
a felony. Recent claims of the IRS abusing its power lend particular weight
to this fear of statutory overreach. In fact, after the original draft of this
article was written, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Marinello v.
United States and heard oral argument on this very issue in December 2017.
This Comment argues that § 7212(a) is unambiguous and contains no
statutory requirement of a nexus test. It recommends how the Supreme Court
should resolve the issue, by limiting omnibus clause charges to affirmative
acts just as other Title 26 felonies are limited. It further argues why Congress
* B.S., Utah Valley University, 2010, Summa Cum Laude; M.S., University of Utah, 2011;
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law, 2018. Thank you to
everyone on the JCLC staff who put time and effort into editing this Comment. I would like
to especially thank Yehuda Ness who went above and beyond in providing very thoughtful
and useful feedback during the writing process and Elizabeth Bright who was extremely
patient with my lengthy and exhaustive edits as the legal landscape surrounding this Comment
shifted more in the last year than I could have possibly imagined.
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should act expediently to modify § 7212(a). Limiting the omnibus clause
beyond its plain meaning is necessary for fair notice and to prevent felony
charges for action meant to be punished as a misdemeanor. Congressional
action is sorely needed in this area of the law where the stakes are high.**
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As this Comment was in the final stages of publication, the Supreme Court decided and
issued its Marinello opinion, preempting any recommendations regarding what the Court
should do. Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144, 2018 WL 1402426 (U.S. 2018). In a
surprising 7–2 opinion, the Court overturned the Second Circuit and made Kassouf’s nexus
test the law nation-wide. Id. at *7. Even though there is no longer a circuit divide and this
Comment may be less relevant in advocating for judicial interpretation, the discussion is still
important in terms of policy making and legislating. This Comment demonstrates that the
Court, while creating precedent that might be good policy, did not correctly interpret
legislative intent. In that sense, the plea for Congressional action is now more relevant than
ever.
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INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Kassouf,1 the Sixth Circuit held that a “nexus test” is
required to convict an individual for criminal tax obstruction under the
“omnibus clause” of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The § 7212(a) omnibus clause
makes it a felony for any individual who “in any other way [other than
through intimidation or impedance of a tax officer or employee] corruptly or
by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or
communication) obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede,
the due administration of [the Internal Revenue Code].”2 Kassouf held that
in order to convict a person of violating the omnibus clause, that person must
be aware of an ongoing investigation or proceeding against them.3 Kassouf’s
requirement that a person have this awareness has been referred to as a
“nexus” test.4 Other circuits have resisted Kassouf’s holding, and confusion
exists even within the Sixth Circuit about whether or not Kassouf is still good
law.5
Kassouf imposed a nexus test on omnibus clause violations
notwithstanding over fifty years of precedent convictions which applied no
such test to the statute.6 The court’s main concern was policy: that without a
nexus test, the omnibus clause “would open [people] up to a host of potential
liability of conduct that is not specifically proscribed.”7 Since Kassouf,
courts that have rejected the nexus requirement have been accused of
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

144 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 1998).
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).
Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 956–58.
Id. at 956–57.
See infra Part II (explaining the circuit split).
See infra Section I.C. (outlining the history of the omnibus clause).
Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 957.
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allowing omnibus clause charges to “expand almost infinitely to reach all
misconduct that is in any way tax-related,”8 and of providing an “overzealous
or partisan prosecutor [an easy path to] investigate, to threaten, to force into
pleading, or perhaps (with luck) to convict anybody.”9 What started as a
moderate concern from the Kassouf court has since become the aim of more
aggressive predictions from those who seem worried that the government is
going to use § 7212(a) to punish everyone who so much as forgets to properly
store their annual Form 1040. In this way, the imagined slope of
prosecutorial abuse of § 7212(a) has been becoming more slippery as
warnings of omnibus clause abuse grow direr.
This concern is
understandable given the somewhat recent concern of abuse of power by the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).10 However, this Comment principally
argues that the Kassouf test, whether or not good policy, is not a correct
interpretation of § 7212(a).
The arguments and suggestions proposed in this Comment articulate
much needed guidance on an issue that is now regularly dividing courts. In
just over three years, five different circuit courts have issued opinions on this
issue.11 One of these opinions attempted to clarify the now confusing
precedent within the Sixth Circuit.12 Another resulted in a forceful dissent to
an en banc hearing request13 and a granted petition to the U.S. Supreme
Court.14 This Comment offers not only the first comprehensive analysis of
almost two decades of case law since the Kassouf holding, but more
importantly, it makes the case about why Kassouf should be overruled by the
Supreme Court while maintaining a different but more important limiting
principle. It concludes by advocating for change which can and should only
be initiated through the legislative process, by Congress. It advises Congress
as to two potential minor alterations to § 7212(a) that could meaningfully
8
Robert S. Fink & Caroline Rule, The Growing Epidemic of Section 7212(a) Prosecutions
– Is Congress the Only Cure?, 88 J. TAX’N 356, 356 (1998).
9
United States v. Marinello, 855 F.3d 455, 457 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc)
(Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
10
See John D. McKinnon & Siobhan Hughes, FBI Launches Probe of IRS, WALL ST. J.
(May 14, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732421600457848320315
3773048 (describing investigation into IRS practice of inappropriately questioning politically
conservative organizations applying for tax-exempt status).
11
United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Marinello,
839 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.
2014).
12
See generally Miner, 774 F.3d 336.
13
Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
14
Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (U.S. June 27, 2017)
(No. 16-1144).
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limit its scope.
This Comment proceeds as follows: it begins in Part I by providing a
brief overview of criminal obstruction statutes and tax crimes to give a
general background. It then focuses specifically on the U.S. tax obstruction
statute, § 7212, and discusses its omnibus clause. As part of the discussion
of § 7212 and its omnibus clause, this Comment briefly discusses the
legislative history of the provision followed by noting how courts have
narrowed the mens rea term “corruptly.”
Part II of this Comment reviews the important circuit court decisions
that have resulted in the conflict presently plaguing courts. It begins by
describing how the Kassouf court, in what it deemed to be an issue of first
impression, interpreted the omnibus clause to include a nexus test. It then
lists and discusses the many circuit court decisions that have declined to
follow the Kassouf holding. It also underscores the confusion within the
Sixth Circuit. Part III presents arguments discussing why Kassouf was
wrongly decided. Part IV advocates for solutions. It advises the Supreme
Court to reject Kassouf and limit the omnibus clause to criminalizing
affirmative acts. It then implores Congress to act, by considering what
function the omnibus clause should serve within the statutory scheme of
criminal tax obstruction and by suggesting minor changes Congress could
make to improve the statutory language.
I. THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE OF SECTION 7212
There are many different obstruction statutes that exist within the U.S.
Code, including § 7212(a). The different statutes have many similarities but
also some stark differences. An understanding of the background of
obstruction crimes and tax crimes generally is necessary to fully comprehend
§ 7212(a) and the role it serves in punishing tax obstruction.
A. CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION IN THE U.S. CODE

Obstruction is “[t]he act of impeding or hindering something” or
“interference.”15
Obstruction statutes criminalize an individual for
“impeding or hindering” some governmental function.16 Various obstruction
statutes exist, most within Title 18 of the U.S. Code.17 Each of these sections
15

Obstruction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 51 (2004) (listing the following examples of obstruction:
“treason, sedition, perjury, bribery, escape, contempt, false personation, destruction of
government property, and assault of a public official . . .”).
17
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2012) (protecting individuals administering federal
processes within the three branches of the U.S. government).
16
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falls within Chapter 73, which defines the crime of “obstruction of justice.”18
Other obstruction statutes exist outside of Title 18, but often serve the same
function of protecting government processes.19 Some of the Title 18 sections
are construed broadly to punish any acts that encumber the official activities
of government agents.20 They often focus explicitly on obstructive use of
force or a type of written threat against another individual.21 However, some
also contain a catch-all word or phrase, ensuring that the statutes are not
limited to only physical or written actions.22
Specifically, obstruction of justice is most commonly prosecuted
through 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and involves demonstrating proof of three
elements: (1) a pending judicial proceeding, (2) defendant’s knowledge of
the proceeding, and (3) obstruction.23
How broadly or narrowly the obstruction statutes should be interpreted
has been thoroughly debated within the federal judiciary and at the highest
levels.24 Determining the knowledge requirement, i.e., mens rea, has been
particularly problematic.25 One point of confusion for courts and prosecutors
has been the use of the term “corruptly” to describe the mens rea for certain
obstruction convictions.26 Early on, however, the Supreme Court attempted
to clarify the issue by holding that obstruction-of-justice mens rea requires
specific intent.27 Pettibone v. United States interpreted one of the earliest
versions of what is now § 1503, stating “the specific intent to violate the
statute must exist to justify a conviction, and this being so, the doctrine that
there may be a transfer of intent in regard to crimes flowing from general
malevolence has no applicability.”28

18

Id.
E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7212 (2012) (punishing obstruction of the Internal Revenue Code).
20
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) (criminalizing the knowing and willful obstruction
of a federal process server).
21
See, e.g., id. § 1503 (making it unlawful to influence or injure court officers or jurors).
22
See, e.g., id. § 1501 (2012) (punishing any individual that “assaults, beats, or wounds
any officer or other person duly authorized,” but also including any obstruction, resistance,
or opposition).
23
See Leigh Ainsworth et al., Obstruction of Justice, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1551 (2016);
Decker, supra note 16, at 54.
24
E.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). In a 5–4 vote, Yates reversed an
obstruction of justice conviction within 18 U.S.C. § 1519, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
after a lengthy debate over the construction of the term “tangible object” within the statute.
Id. at 1076.
25
See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (where a divided Supreme Court
debated the mens rea required for a conviction under § 1503).
26
Decker, supra note 16, at 58.
27
Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206–07 (1893).
28
Id. at 207.
19
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B. TAX CRIMES GENERALLY AND TAX OBSTRUCTION

Most criminal violations of the tax code are prosecuted under one of
three sections of the Internal Revenue Code.29 These three sections include
two felonies (tax evasion30 and filing a false tax return31) as well as one
misdemeanor: the “[w]illful failure to file [a tax] return, supply information,
or pay tax.”32
A criminal provision of the tax code that is becoming increasingly
important is § 7212, titled “Attempts to interfere with administration of
internal revenue laws.”33 It specifically criminalizes tax obstruction by
individuals.34 Subsection (a) of the statute punishes (as a felony) an
individual who does any of the following:
[C]orruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or
communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the
United States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly
or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication)
obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this
35
title.

This subsection separates into two clauses. The first clause of § 7212(a)
criminalizes using or threatening force against an IRS officer who is acting
on official business.36 The second clause and the focus of this Comment,
often referred to as the “omnibus clause” or the “catch-all” clause,37 includes
any act that “in any other way corruptly or by force or threats of force
29
Dante Marrazzo, Practitioners-Beware the Trojan Horse: The Government
Unsheathes an Old Weapon to Target Practitioners for Criminal Tax Offenses, 13 AKRON
TAX J. 85, 86 (1997).
30
See 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012) (titled “Attempt to evade or defeat tax”).
31
See id. § 7206(1) (a subsection of “Fraud and False Statements”). Crimes under this
section have a three-year maximum prison sentence as opposed to five years for tax evasion.
See id. §§ 7206, 7201.
32
Id. § 7203.
33
Id. § 7212.
34
One author has hypothesized that all criminal violations in a tax setting are obstructive
in nature and could generally be referred to as obstruction crimes. See John A. Townsend,
Tax Obstruction Crimes: Is Making the IRS’s Job Harder Enough?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX
L.J. 260, 264–65 (2009). Townsend argues that all tax crimes involve “attempts to impair or
impede the functioning of the IRS in the ascertainment or collection of tax liabilities.” Id. at
264. He distinguishes them between what he calls the “substantive” tax crimes and two
statutes used to punish tax obstruction: 26 U.S.C. § 7212 and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012) (the socalled “Klein conspiracy”). Id.
35
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). Section 7212(a) includes a maximum prison sentence of three
years if force is used or one year if the act consists of only threats of force.
36
It punishes “[w]hoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any
threatening letter or communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or
employee of the United States acting in an official capacity under this title . . .” Id.
37
E.g., United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998).
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(including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, or
endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [the Internal
Revenue Code].”38
C. HISTORY OF SECTION 7212 AND THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE

Section 7212 has its roots in the Revenue Act of 1862, where § 7212’s
predecessor originally served as a means to punish forceful interference with
tax collectors.39 What came to be known as the omnibus clause was included
over ninety years later in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.40 The
legislative history of its enactment is short, and for the most part,
unrevealing.41 Some have speculated that the omnibus clause language was
drawn directly from the omnibus clause of the federal obstruction of justice
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, since the wording is nearly identical.42
For the first few decades after the enactment of § 7212’s predecessor,
prosecutors took a more cautious approach than they currently take when
using the omnibus clause.43 The clause was dormant in criminal tax
convictions until 1981, when, in United States v. Williams, it was used to
convict three men of filing false withholding exemption certificates.44
Whether because prosecutors felt more empowered to use the omnibus clause
after Williams or because the IRS was looking for new tools to battle
increasing tax fraud, the clause started to be used on a much more regular
basis after Williams was decided.45
38

26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
Revenue Act of 1862, ch. 119, § 28, 12 Stat. 432, 444 (1862); Marrazzo, supra note
29, at 87.
40
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7212(a), 68A Stat. 851, 855 (1954); United
States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 n.12 (8th Cir. 1981); Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 88.
41
See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 604 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621,
5254 (mainly discussing differences in punishment between when the crime involves force
and when it involves threats of force and comparing the statute with 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2012),
which does not include “threats of force” as § 7212 does); H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at A427
(1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4574-7 (making no mention of the omnibus
clause).
42
E.g., Townsend, supra note 34, at 283–84.
43
See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(detailing the government’s argument that § 7212(a) “applies only to acts or threats of
physical violence . . .”) (internal quotations omitted).
44
See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that the
court’s research had uncovered no case law applying the omnibus clause of § 7212(a)). The
court upheld the conviction as a legitimate use of the omnibus clause. See id. at 701.
45
See Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 89–90 (describing more frequent use § 7212(a) by
prosecutors and explaining “[a]s tax fraud schemes became more complicated, more difficult
to detect, and increasingly difficult to prosecute under the more familiar statutes, the
government had to seek innovative approaches to combat tax scofflaws”). The Marrazzo
39
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D. REQUISITE MENS REA FOR OMNIBUS CLAUSE CONVICTIONS

To prosecute an act not involving force or threats of force under
§ 7212(a), Congress requires a showing that the act was done “corruptly.”46
United States v. Reeves was the first case to apply “corruptly” to § 7212(a)’s
omnibus clause and went into great detail to discern the legislative intent
behind the language.47 Lester Reeves was convicted under § 7212 for filing
a common law lien against a tax investigator.48 The Fifth Circuit reversed
Reeves’s conviction, stating “[i]t is unlikely that ‘corruptly’ merely means
‘intentionally’ or ‘with improper motive or bad or evil purpose.’”49 Because
§ 7212(a) also punishes an “endeavor,” the Reeves court explained that using
“corrupt” simply to mean “intentional” would make the word superfluous,
since the court concluded that “one cannot ‘endeavor’ what one does not
already ‘intend.’”50 The Fifth Circuit said, “‘[c]orruptly’ is a word with
strong connotations; it is difficult to believe Congress included this ‘key’
word only to have it read out of the statute or absorbed into the meaning of
‘endeavor.’”51 Instead, the Fifth Circuit found, through review of the
legislative history, that “corruptly” was meant to forbid “those acts done with
the intent to secure an unlawful benefit either for oneself or for another.”52
The Reeves dissent, on the other hand, argued that “corruptly” should be
interpreted broadly.53 Judge Williams emphasized in dissent that corruptly
is interpreted under other criminal statutes and should be interpreted in §
7212(a) to include acts that simply have an “improper motive or bad or evil
purpose.”54
Reeves indicated that the “unlawful benefit” achieved is one acquired
“under the tax laws.”55 However, this part of the Reeves decision has been
overruled to require only any broad unlawful benefit.56 The Reeves holding
has now been widely accepted among most circuits as the mens rea required

article speculates that “[t]he government now looks to section 7212(a) in virtually every tax
case.” See id. at 90.
46
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).
47
752 F.2d 995, 998–1000 (5th Cir. 1985).
48
Id. at 996–97.
49
Id. at 998.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1985).
53
Id. at 1002–04 (Williams, J., dissenting).
54
Id. at 1002 (Williams, J., dissenting).
55
Id. at 1000.
56
United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298, 305–06 (5th Cir. 2005). The question of
whether or not the advantage must be financial in nature arose in United States v. Yagow,
953 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1992), but no court has yet adopted this requirement.
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for omnibus clause convictions.57
Almost every tax felony and misdemeanor contains the “willful” mens
rea standard, making § 7212 an exception with its easier-to-satisfy
“corruptly” requirement.58 For a prosecutor to show that a crime was
“willful,” he or she must “prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant,
that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally
violated that duty.”59 The argument has been made that Congress intended
corrupt intent to mean the same thing as willful intent, but courts have
rejected this conclusion.60 The main difference between the two standards is
the knowledge of an illegal act under the “willful” standard and the lesser
knowledge of unlawful benefit (perhaps even obtained from a legal act) under
the “corruptly” standard.61
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Kassouf relied on United States v. Aguilar62 when it split from other
circuits and required a nexus test. Since then, a majority of circuit courts
have explicitly rejected Kassouf, and Sixth Circuit judges have been
conflicted on the issue. Following the development of precedent on the nexus
test issue is important to understand its legal evolution, the arguments that
caused the circuit split, and examples of facts that caused prosecutors to
charge individuals under the omnibus clause.
A. KASSOUF APPLIES AGUILAR TO NARROW THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE

The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit court to take up the question of
whether the Government is required to allege knowledge of a formal
investigation or proceeding in order to charge a person with tax obstruction
under § 7212(a).63 In United States v. Kassouf, James Kassouf was charged
57
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL TAX MANUAL 118 (2012) (listing cases from the
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits that have adopted the Reeves
definition of “corruptly”); see also United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 347 (6th Cir. 2014)
(making reference to Reeves in discussing the “corruptly” element of § 7212(a)); United
States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998).
58
Jenny L. Johnson Ware, Obstruction and Obscenity: “I Know It When I See It,”
Aug.–Sept. J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 19, 20 (2017).
59
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).
60
See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting
“willfulness” as a “necessary element of § 7212(a)”).
61
Ware, supra note 58, at 21. Some courts are seemingly incorporating the willful
standard through the use of jury instructions that require the jury to show knowledge of
illegality while outwardly denying that the two standards are the same. Id.
62
515 U.S. 593 (1995).
63
See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating “[i]ndeed no
circuit courts have directly confronted the issue before us today . . .”). Prior to Kassouf,
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with three different tax crimes, including a violation of § 7212(a)’s omnibus
clause.64 Charges under § 7212(a) were brought based on allegations that
Kassouf had corruptly obstructed the IRS’s ability to track his personal
financial activity because he intermingled funds between personal accounts
and those of businesses under his control, failed to keep adequate records of
those transactions, and omitted them from his personal tax return.65 Kassouf
filed for dismissal of the § 7212(a) claim, arguing, among other things, that
the prosecution had not adequately pled a violation of the omnibus clause
because it did not allege that Kassouf had knowledge of an ongoing IRS
investigation into his activities.66 The district court agreed that the
prosecution had not adequately stated a claim, and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.67 The issue was brought before the Sixth Circuit approximately
three years after the Supreme Court decided United States v. Aguilar.68 The
district court that dismissed Kassouf’s claim applied Aguilar to limit the use
of the omnibus clause.69
In Aguilar, a federal district court judge, Robert Aguilar, was convicted
by a jury of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).70 When Judge
Aguilar’s conviction was overturned by the Ninth Circuit,71 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to evaluate the omnibus clause in the federal
obstruction of justice statute.72 The Ninth Circuit overturned Aguilar’s
conviction because no evidence showed that Aguilar had the requisite
knowledge that his testimony before investigators (the act which led to his
conviction) would be relied upon by a grand jury.73 The Court upheld the
Ninth Circuit’s reversal, holding that when prosecutors apply § 1503, which
has language similar to § 7212,74 they are required to show a “nexus,” “that
the act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with [a] judicial

convictions under the omnibus clause were made without considering whether knowledge of
an ongoing investigation or proceeding was in process. See id. at 955–56 (listing cases).
64
Id. at 953.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 954.
67
Id. at 953.
68
515 U.S. 593 (1995).
69
United States v. Kassouf, 948 F. Supp. 36, 37–38 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
70
515 U.S. at 595.
71
See generally United States v. Aguilar, 21 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
72
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 595–97.
73
Id. at 601. Judge Aguilar was convicted after making false statements to FBI agents
during questioning about his disclosure of a wiretap to an individual under investigation for
embezzling funds from a labor union. Id. at 595–96.
74
“Whoever . . . corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
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proceeding[].”75 In upholding the reversal of Aguilar’s conviction, the Court:
[E]xercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute, both out of
deference to the prerogatives of Congress, . . . and out of concern that a fair warning
should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of
76
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.

The Sixth Circuit applied the Aguilar reasoning in Kassouf and read a
nexus requirement into the § 7212(a) omnibus clause.77 The Sixth Circuit
reasoned that bringing a charge of obstruction against a taxpayer who failed
to keep adequate financial records for tax purposes, but was not under audit,
would give the IRS broad power to prosecute speculative conduct and would
allow authority beyond what Congress intended.78
B. CIRCUIT COURTS BROADEN THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE

Despite Kassouf, the federal government continued bringing charges
against taxpayers under the § 7212(a) omnibus clause without fulfilling the
Kassouf nexus requirement.79 By ignoring the nexus test, prosecutors paved
the way for challenges in other circuits where taxpayers cited Kassouf as
persuasive precedent80 as well as challenges by those being prosecuted within
the Sixth Circuit who argued that the laws of other circuits should apply.81
As shown below, taxpayers overwhelmingly lose when citing Kassouf in
other circuits, and its application within the Sixth Circuit remains uncertain.82
1. Other Circuits Disagree with the Nexus Requirement
Other courts have continued to follow pre-Kassouf precedent or deny
Kassouf’s nexus requirement, creating a split with the Sixth Circuit over
whether Aguilar’s holding applied to § 7212(a).83 In the Ninth Circuit, the
Massey decision affirmed a district court conviction where a nexus test was

75

Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599.
Id. at 600 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), and citing
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
77
United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998).
78
Id. at 957–58. The court said that to hold otherwise “would be permitting the IRS to
impose liability for conduct which was legal (such as failure to maintain records) and
occurred long before an IRS audit, or even a tax return was filed.” Id. at 957.
79
See, e.g., United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1992), a pre-Kassouf opinion holding that
§ 7212(a) only required showing that a defendant hoped for financial benefit).
80
E.g., United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 703 (10th Cir. 2010).
81
E.g., United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999).
82
See infra Introduction.
83
E.g., Wood, 384 F. App’x at 703–04 (stating that “[i]n our view, Kassouf is not
persuasive”).
76
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not applied.84 Shane Massey was convicted under the omnibus clause after
he refused to file tax returns for multiple years and made continuous threats
of legal action against IRS agents who sought his compliance with tax laws.85
The Massey court rejected the nexus test by citing a Ninth Circuit decision
that predated Kassouf.86
The Tenth Circuit likewise disposed of the Kassouf nexus test in United
States v. Wood by citing Bowman, a later Sixth Circuit decision that, as
discussed below, put Kassouf’s holding into doubt.87 The Tenth Circuit also
rejected the similarity between § 1503(a) and § 7212(a), and agreed with
precedent from the Ninth Circuit and other district court opinions rejecting
the nexus test.88 A jury in a Utah district court convicted attorney Thomas
Wood of violating the § 7212(a) omnibus clause after he used offshore bank
accounts and foreign-issued debit cards to avoid detection by the IRS of
taxable income that should have been reported by him and his clients.89 In
comparing § 7212(a) and § 1503(a), the Wood court noted that § 1503(a)
narrowly defines and even lists conduct that interferes with justice.90 Section
7212(a), on the other hand, broadly involves impedance or obstruction of
administration of the tax code, which could include “any arrangement that
permits a taxable entity to avoid reporting income in the taxable year when
earned.”91
The First Circuit in Floyd swiftly denied the nexus requirement.92 It
mentioned Kassouf in a footnote but denied (perhaps prematurely) that it was
still good law in the Sixth Circuit, given Bowman.93
The Tenth Circuit took up the issue again in its opinion in United States
v. Sorensen.94 Jerold Sorensen was convicted of using a “pure trust” scheme
84

Massey, 419 F.3d at 1010. The Massey court made no mention of Kassouf or Aguilar
and swiftly dismissed the nexus requirement. Id. (“The law of this circuit establishes that the
government need not prove that the defendant was aware of an ongoing tax investigation to
obtain a conviction under § 7212(a) . . .”); see also United States v. Dain, 258 F. App’x 90,
93–94 (9th Cir. 2007) (explicitly rejecting the Kassouf nexus requirement by following
Massey).
85
Massey, 419 F.3d at 1009.
86
Id. at 1010 (citing United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir.1992) as
precedent that rejected the nexus requirement).
87
384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d
595 (6th Cir. 1999)); see infra Introduction.
88
Wood, 384 F. App’x at 704.
89
Id. at 700–01.
90
Id. at 704.
91
Id. (quoting United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1991)).
92
United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 31–32 (1st Cir. 2014).
93
Id. at 32 n.4. See infra Introduction (discussing why courts considered Kassouf to be
overruled by Bowman and how Kassouf remains binding on the Sixth Circuit).
94
801 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2015).
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to shield business income by using it to pay rent for his personal residence
and business assets that had been transferred into trusts he thought to be
undetectable by the IRS.95 Sorensen argued that the court should apply the
Kassouf nexus test and overturn his conviction since most of the obstructive
activity Sorensen engaged in occurred before any investigation or proceeding
against him.96 Nevertheless, the Sorensen court followed Wood and rejected
the nexus test.97
A Second Circuit panel heard the issue in United States v. Marinello.98
Carlo Marinello ran a business as a courier of documents and packages.99 He
failed to keep adequate records of his business transactions, shredding most
paper evidence of business activities.100 He paid his employees in cash,
keeping no record and hampering the IRS’s ability to track their income.101
He also paid many personal expenses using business cash.102 An IRS
investigation had been initiated into Marinello’s business activities, but an
agent later recommended closing it because she could not assess the
materiality of his income.103 Marinello had no knowledge of that initial
investigation.104 Marinello was convicted by a jury and later appealed,
arguing that the Second Circuit should adopt the Kassouf nexus test.105 The
court disagreed, mainly arguing that it did not find sufficient parallelism
between § 7212(a) and § 1503(a) to justify applying the Aguilar holding to §
7212(a).106 The court also seemed to set a new precedent in omnibus clause
jurisprudence in explicitly holding that taxpayers could violate the omnibus
clause through omissions, without proof of an affirmative act.107
Although none of the judges on the Marinello panel offered a dissenting
opinion, an en banc hearing was requested.108 The Second Circuit, having a
reputation for very infrequently granting en banc reviews,109 unsurprisingly

95

Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1231.
97
Id. at 1232.
98
839 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2016).
99
Id. at 211.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 211–12.
103
Id. at 212.
104
United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 212 (2d Cir. 2016).
105
Id. at 216–17.
106
Id. at 220–23.
107
Id. at 225.
108
United States v. Marinello, 855 F.3d 455, 455 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en
banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
109
See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review In the
Second Circuit, 256 N.Y. L.J. 38 (2016).
96
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denied the request.110 However, two judges dissented from the denial.111 One
dissenting judge wrote a powerful disagreement with the Second Circuit
majority’s holding, acknowledging that Kassouf “is now distinctly in the
minority” and describing the majority’s holding as “sign[ing] on to the
emerging consensus of error in the circuit courts.”112 The dissent listed five
of eight acts enumerated in the Marinello jury instructions113 as violations of
the omnibus clause and attributed these items specifically to the familiar
charge that without the Kassouf nexus test, prosecutorial abuse of the
omnibus clause would become rampant.114 This dissenting opinion
predominantly couched its argument in this “slippery slope” policy
concern.115 The Supreme Court granted Marinello’s petition for certiorari116
and heard oral argument on December 6, 2017.117
Most recently, the Fifth Circuit took up the issue when Tamny
Westbrooks, owner of tax preparation businesses, “grossly inflat[ed]” wage
expenses on her tax returns.118 Prior to Westbrooks, the court had implicitly
rejected the nexus test requirement, but had reached no conclusion on the
persuasiveness of Kassouf.119 The Westbrooks court outright rejected
Kassouf, noting numerous reasons why it “did not correctly interpret section
7212(a).”120
The First, Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all now refused
to apply the Kassouf nexus requirement as outlined above. In addition to
these five circuits expressly rejecting Kassouf, other circuits have effectively
rejected Kassouf by declining to include a nexus requirement as an element
110

Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
112
Id. at 456.
113
The Marinello jury was instructed that any of eight separate acts could constitute the
actus reus of an omnibus clause violation. United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 213 (2d
Cir. 2016). Despite the dissent’s concern that committing any one of the listed acts alone
could have resulted in Marinello’s conviction, Marinello was convicted of all eight acts. See
id. at 214. Therefore, the dissent’s apprehension that any single factor on the list could
actually meet all elements of an omnibus clause violation can be only hypothetical, since it
was a combination of all eight factors that led to Marinello’s conviction.
114
Marinello, 855 F.3d at 455 (denying rehearing en banc) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing “[i]f this is the law, nobody is safe . . .”).
115
The dissent also briefly counters an argument made by the Second Circuit panel
about the lack of legislative history for the § 7212(a) omnibus clause. See id. at 459.
116
U.S. v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, cert granted, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (U.S. June 27,
2017) (No. 16-1144).
117
See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144
(U.S. argued Dec. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 6040470.
118
United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 321 (5th Cir. 2017).
119
Id. at 322–23.
120
Id. at 323.
111

VALCARCE_TECHNICALREVIEW2.0

350

4/13/18 11:06 AM

VALCARCE

[Vol. 108

of § 7212(a) omnibus clause prosecutions.121
2. Bowman Walks Back Kassouf
Less than one year after Kassouf, a Sixth Circuit panel heard a case in
which the prosecution ignored the nexus test created by Kassouf in its
pleadings.122 In United States v. Bowman, David Bowman was convicted
after filing falsified tax forms meant to cause IRS investigations against
creditors who were seeking foreclosure and judgements against him.123 On
appeal, Bowman argued that Kassouf required the prosecution to demonstrate
that the IRS was investigating him.124 The panel deciding Bowman not only
refused to apply the nexus test to Bowman’s acts, but rejected the notion that
Kassouf produced a nexus requirement at all.125 Because the Kassouf court
left open the possibility of upholding the pre-Aguilar § 7212(a) convictions,
despite those convictions not having satisfied a nexus standard,126 the
Bowman court concluded that Kassouf was “limited to its precise holding and
facts, and that it cannot be read to encompass the kind of activity for which
Bowman was indicted.”127 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit was influenced by
a pre-Kassouf Ninth Circuit opinion with nearly identical facts.128 Bowman
purported to all but eliminate the nexus test as a per se rule and other circuits
cited it as having overruled Kassouf.129
C. SIXTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS DISTRICT COURT APPLYING BOWMAN
OVER KASSOUF

Not only was the Bowman holding persuasive in other circuits, one
district court within the Sixth Circuit cited it when refusing to apply the nexus

121

Brief for Appellee at 13–14, United States v. Marinello, No. 15-2224 (2d Cir. Dec.
14, 2015) (listing cases from the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh circuits).
122
United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1999).
123
Id. at 596–97, 599.
124
Id. at 599.
125
Id. “But Kassouf did not, as Aguilar did, explicitly impose a ‘nexus’ requirement.”
Id.
126
“While these [pre-Aguilar] cases may provide some support for a reading of the
statute that reaches conduct committed before a defendant was aware of a pending IRS
action under the Internal Revenue Code, we decline to extend their holdings to reach the
conduct involved in this case.” United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998).
127
Bowman, 173 F.3d at 600.
128
Id. at 599 (describing United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1992), which
“affirmed the conviction of a defendant who had filed false 1099 and 1096 forms, the very
activity involved in the instant case”).
129
United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 345 (6th Cir. 2014) (listing cases from other
circuits that “have concluded that Bowman functionally eviscerated Kassouf”).
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requirement.130 Richard Gilbert was charged under the § 7212(a) omnibus
clause after he “allegedly executed and mailed various fraudulent documents
to the [IRS] in an attempt to evade payment of taxes.”131 He filed for
dismissal, arguing that no IRS action was in process when the alleged acts
occurred.132 Referencing Bowman, the court concluded that “[t]he most
recent guidance from the Sixth Circuit indicates than an IRS action is not
required.”133 The Sixth Circuit heard an appeal from Gilbert after the trial
and affirmed Gilbert’s conviction on both counts without any consideration
of the issue involving the Kassouf nexus test.134
D. MINER WALKS BACK BOWMAN

Despite other courts considering Kassouf to have been overruled by
Bowman, the Sixth Circuit continued to selectively apply the nexus test to
convictions under § 7212(a).135 The future of the omnibus clause nexus
requirement and how future Sixth Circuit judges might reconcile Kassouf
with Bowman was uncertain when United States v. Miner136 came before a
Sixth Circuit panel in 2014.
Miner had been convicted under the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) and
appealed to the Sixth Circuit, arguing that the trial court had failed to include
the Kassouf nexus test in the jury instructions.137 Miner had been convicted
under the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) for sending frivolous and threatening
letters to IRS agents on behalf of clients in an attempt to coerce changes to
internal IRS income tax files.138 The Miner court did not expressly
acknowledge a conflict between the two previously discussed cases, holding
that Kassouf was controlling and upholding the validity of the nexus test
while simultaneously declining to overrule Bowman.139 Rather, the court
posited that Bowman might be an exception to Kassouf.140 Bowman’s future
130
United States v. Gilbert, No. 3:09CR-57-S, 2009 WL 2382445, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July
30, 2009).
131
Id. at *1.
132
Id. at *3.
133
Id.
134
United States v. Gilbert, 476 F. App’x 434 (6th Cir. 2012).
135
United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 372 (6th Cir. 2004). McBride mentions the
nexus test as a requirement for conviction under the omnibus clause with no mention of
Bowman. Id. This omission, however, could be the result of the fact that McBride knew he
was under investigation, and nexus was not an issue. Id.
136
774 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2014).
137
Id. at 342.
138
Id. at 339.
139
Id. at 345 (“[W]here the rationales of Kassouf and Bowman conflict, we are bound to
follow the former, not the latter.”).
140
Id. at 344.
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is less than certain though, given the Miner court’s general criticism of its
reasoning.141
Even though the Miner panel expressed an opinion with regards to
Kassouf and Bowman, it was not dispositive because of the harmless error
rule.142 The harmless error rule is a criminal appellate review standard that
allows a reviewing court to affirm a lower court opinion when it concludes
that an error would not have altered a substantial right of the defendant.143
The court affirmed Miner’s conviction by deciding that omission of a jury
instruction describing the nexus requirement was a harmless error at Miner’s
trial.144 Ultimately, since the Miner court’s position on the nexus requirement
issue did not result in the reversal of Miner’s conviction, future Sixth Circuit
decisions may not be bound by Miners’s conclusion on the nexus issue
because this conclusion was not “necessary to the outcome,” and as such, it
is non-binding dicta.145
E. DISTRICT COURT WITHIN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT APPLIES MINER

The Miner holding has been used once to apply the nexus requirement
and uphold the dismissal of an omnibus clause charge brought in a district
court within the Sixth Circuit.146 Fesum Ogbazion, owner of a tax preparation
business, was charged with multiple obstructive acts, including “back-dating,
forward-dating, and falsely signing e-file authorization forms; . . . falsely
inflat[ing] Schedule C income [for clients],” and creating fraudulent W-2

141

The Sixth Circuit stated:
Thus, Bowman rejected Kassouf as erecting an inflexible baseline proxy test for intent—
awareness of a pending proceeding—that was under-inclusive as applied to the
defendant in Bowman. But that is exactly the same criticism that the dissents in Kassouf
and Aguilar had made earlier, to no avail . . . . Bowman, therefore, is largely predicated
upon a rationale that had already lost in this court a year before it was decided.
Id. at 344–45 (citing United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 960 (6th Cir. 1998)
(Daughtrey, J., dissenting); United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 613 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
142
United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir. 2014).
143
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
144
Miner, 774 F.3d at 346. The Miner court concluded that omission of the nexus
requirement was a harmless error because it found ample evidence in the trial record
showing that Miner was aware of an IRS proceeding against him and that correct jury
instruction wouldn’t have altered the outcome of the trial. Id.
145
Haddad v. Alexander, Zelmanski, Danner & Fioritto, PLLC, 758 F.3d 777, 781 (6th
Cir. 2014) (“If the statement is not necessary to the outcome, it is dicta and nonbinding.”
(citing United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367, 375–76 (6th Cir. 2011)).
146
United States v. Ogbazion, No. 3:15-CR-104, 2016 WL 6070365 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17,
2016).
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forms for clients.147 The government did not allege that Ogbazion had
knowledge of the investigation when he committed the obstructive acts, but
rather argued that his company’s status as an Electronic Return Originator
put him on notice of the likelihood of future IRS audits.148 The court
distinguished between a “specific pending IRS action, [and] the mere
anticipation of a routine compliance audit.”149 It held that expectation of an
audit was not enough and that the government must show something like “a
planned IRS audit of which [the defendant] was actually aware.”150
III. WHY KASSOUF WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
For numerous reasons, Kassouf should be overruled in all circuits. The
plain text of § 7212(a) does not include a nexus test. Aguilar is not binding
precedent and should not apply to § 7212(a). Despite the need for a limiting
principle to § 7212(a), courts should not apply a nexus test to a statute where
no such test was intended.
A. THERE IS NO TEXTUAL AMBIGUITY IN SECTION 7212(A)

The fact that Congress specifically drafted § 7212(a) to punish corrupt
“endeavors” to obstruct “administration of this title” demonstrates that there
is no ambiguity within the omnibus clause, as these words have clear
meaning. Where there is no statutory ambiguity, courts are limited in their
application of the rule of lenity or their examination of legislative history,
where it exists.
1. “Administration of this Title” Has Plain Meaning
The phrase “due administration of this title” within § 7212(a) has
purposefully broad application. Congress, no doubt concerned about the
government’s ability to collect revenue and the increasing availability of
tools for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes, expanded the statute beyond its
original purpose, which was to prevent force or threats of force.151 Most
notably, Congress expanded the statute by adding the omnibus clause of §
7212(a), which punishes “corrupt” obstruction that occurs “in any other
way.” Corruptly—“with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with
official duty and the rights of others”152—obstructing administration of the
tax code “in any other way” is definitively broad.
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at *16.
Id. at *17.
Id. at *18 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
See supra Section I.C.
United States v. Winchell, 129 F.3d 1093, 1099 (10th Cir. 1997).
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During the Sorensen trial, the Tenth Circuit surmised in its jury
instruction that the administration of the tax code could encompass anything
involving “carrying out [the IRS’s] lawful functions to ascertain income;
compute, assess, and collect income taxes; audit tax returns and records; and
investigate possible criminal violations of the internal revenue laws.”153 To
limit the meaning of “administration of this title” sufficiently enough to infer
a nexus requirement from the statute requires ignoring acts that corruptly
limit certain lawful functions of the tax code as outlined in the Sorensen jury
instruction quoted above. The nexus test requires defendant knowledge of
an ongoing IRS investigation or proceeding.154 Having to satisfy this
requirement excludes any obstructive act that occurs prior to an enforcement
proceeding or any act committed by a defendant who is not aware of an
enforcement action.
Thus, Kassouf’s holding effectively requires the inference that the §
7212(a) omnibus clause was only intended to punish acts that occur while the
IRS is “audit[ing] tax returns and records”155 or “investigat[ing] possible
criminal violations,” as only these two items from the Sorensen jury
instructions would satisfy the nexus test’s requirement.156 Drawing this
conclusion from the language of the statute requires stretching beyond the
language and inferring something that Congress did not express. Certainly,
if Congress meant for the § 7212(a) omnibus clause to apply only to acts that
corruptly obstruct IRS “proceedings,” Congress could have easily added a
few simple words to make this legislative intent known.157 Instead, Congress
drafted the statute using the broadest language possible. “Any other way”
and “due administration”158 are not the words that a cautious lawmaker uses
to limit the reach of a criminal statute. Rather, they are carefully crafted
terms that were more likely used for expansionary purposes, seeing as how
the omnibus clause was created specifically for the purpose of expanding §

153

United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1229 (10th Cir. 2015).
United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998).
155
It is not immediately obvious that knowledge of a civil investigation such as an IRS
audit would satisfy the nexus requirement but the Kassouf court, in a footnote, considered
civil proceedings to be sufficient. See id. at 957 n.2 (defining what types of investigations
and proceedings meet the nexus requirement: “[t]his may include, but is not limited to,
subpoenas, audits[,] or criminal tax investigations”)
156
See Sorensen, 801 F.3d at 1229.
157
For example, the omnibus clause of § 7212(a) could have been drafted to punish acts
which “corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or
communication) obstruct[] or impede[], or endeavor[] to obstruct or impede, enforcement
proceedings within the due administration of this title” (added hypothetical language
emphasized).
158
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).
154
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7212(a).159
Furthermore, analyzing the statute and considering only the word
“administration” shows that a nexus requirement should not be inferred from
the statutory language.160 Administration is defined as “[t]he management or
performance of the executive duties of a government, institution, or business;
collectively, all the actions that are involved in managing the work of an
organization.”161 In fact, had Congress meant to require an official
proceeding as an element of the crime, it could have merely replaced
“administration” with “enforcement.” Enforcement, a term with a much
narrower meaning, is defined as “[t]he act or process of compelling
compliance with a law, mandate, command, decree, or agreement.” 162 It is
the job of legislators to carefully choose the words that they use, and the fact
that Congress used the broader term “administration,” instead of a narrower
term like “enforcement,” indicates the breadth with which it intended § 7212
to be interpreted.
2. “Endeavor” is Synonymous with Attempt
“Endeavor” is another term within § 7212(a) that is not friendly to the
constructionists who would create a nexus requirement. “Endeavor” means
“[a] systematic or continuous effort to attain some goal; any effort or assay
to accomplish some goal or purpose.”163 What is not included in the
definition of endeavor is any mention of whether or not the “effort” yields
success. It is clear from this definition that one can be considered to
“endeavor” to do something whether or not that endeavor is fruitful or in spite
of failure. Thus, the dictionary definition of “endeavor” can encompass both
an act towards some end or an attempted act towards that end.
Putting the term in the context of § 7212(a), however, requires
separating a successful act with the attempt towards that act. The statute says
“obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede.”164 This shows
that, as used in § 7212(a), “endeavor” is equated only with the attempt and
not with the successful act. This must be so because if “endeavor,” in the
context of § 7212(a), refers to a successful act as well, it would render the

159

See infra Section I.C (discussing the enactment of the omnibus clause).
See, e.g., Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1129 (2015) (arguing that
“the Federal Tax Code has long treated information gathering as a phase of tax
administration procedure that occurs before assessment, levy, or collection”) (emphasis
added).
161
Administration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added).
162
Enforcement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
163
Endeavor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
164
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).
160
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“endeavor” clause superfluous,165 as the immediately preceding phrase
“obstructs or impedes” already refers to the successful act. The clause in its
entirety would effectively read “obstructs or impedes,” which simply means
acts to obstruct or impede “or acts to obstruct or impede.” Surely Congress
did not intend to repeat the same functional phrase twice. Thus, “endeavor,”
in the context of § 7212(a), must refer only to attempts and could otherwise
have been written as “obstructs or impedes, or attempts to obstruct or
impede.” In consideration of this meaning for the word endeavor, a nexus
requirement cannot survive.
Even if Congress only meant to punish an act that would obstruct or
impede an official investigation or proceeding, an attempt to obstruct a
proceeding does not require that an actual proceeding exist at all. The attempt
could be mistaken. The Kassouf nexus test, on the other hand, requires
knowledge of an actual investigation or proceeding.166 Therefore, the nexus
requirement reads the word “endeavor”—as it pertains to the attempt to
obstruct a nonexistent proceeding or investigation—right out of the statute.
Ultimately, Kassouf eliminated the punishment of attempts that were meant
to be within the purview of punishable offenses in the § 7212(a) omnibus
clause.
Justice Scalia made this argument in the Aguilar dissent.167 The
majority in Aguilar had a more limited view of the meaning of “endeavor.”168
The majority responded to Scalia by interpreting “endeavor” to only include
instances where there was a proceeding and an attempt to obstruct it was
somehow frustrated.169 In contrast, Scalia’s interpretation of “endeavor” also
included attempts to thwart a non-existent, but anticipated, proceeding.170 In
the majority’s own words, it defined “endeavor” as “mak[ing] conduct
punishable where the defendant acts with an intent to obstruct justice, and in
165

It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that courts should not read a statute
in a way that makes some language of the statute superfluous to other language in the statute.
See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009).
166
United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “due
administration of the Title requires some pending IRS action of which the defendant was
aware”) (emphasis added).
167
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 609–12 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia further developed the argument by explaining that factual impossibility is not a
valid legal doctrine as applied to facts in Aguilar. Id. at 593 (“In Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966), we dismissed out of hand the ‘impossibility’ defense of a
defendant who had sought to convey a bribe to a prospective juror through an intermediary
who was secretly working for the Government.”).
168
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601–02. It is interesting to note that the majority felt it
necessary to preemptively criticize the dissent’s argument related to the construction of
“endeavor” before it imparted with its own definition.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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a manner that is likely to obstruct justice, but is foiled in some way.”171 The
Court further used an example to describe the only type of attempt it
concluded would violate the statute: “[w]ere a defendant with the requisite
intent to lie to a subpoenaed witness who is ultimately not called to testify,
or who testifies but does not transmit the defendant’s version of the story, the
defendant has endeavored to obstruct, but has not actually obstructed,
justice.”172 On the other hand, the Aguilar majority would not, find guilt
where a defendant, who thought he was under investigation, took all the steps
necessary to thwart it (including force or threats of force), but it was later
determined that no such investigation was in process.173
Dividing the term “endeavor”—to refer to attempts that were thwarted
but not attempts to obstruct an anticipated but nonexistent IRS action—
appears to be parsing the definition of “endeavor” to only include the element
that molds with the desired judicial conclusion (the nexus requirement) and
disposing of the remainder simply because the word still has “a useful
function to fulfill.”174 This conclusion denies the plain meaning of
“endeavor,” contrary to sound principles of statutory construction. It is an
important canon that words should be given their plain meaning.175 To
partition a word’s meaning, including instances where it conforms to a
desired policy outcome and excluding instances where it does not, is surely
an example of a deviation from the plain meaning rule. On this point, the
Aguilar dissent is more persuasive than the majority opinion.
3. Courts Should Not Apply the Rule of Lenity to Create a Nexus Test
One premise on which Kassouf based its holding was the rule of
lenity.176 The Supreme Court defines the rule of lenity as a requirement
“under which we must construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the
defendant.”177 Lenity, however, for the same reasons that make the statute
171

Id. at 601–02.
Id.
173
See supra note 168 (author’s comments regarding the Aguilar majority’s treatment of
“endeavor”).
174
Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601 (describing Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion).
175
“A fundamental canon of statutory construction instructs that, unless otherwise
defined, words are interpreted to take their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning in the
absence of persuasive reasons to the contrary.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER,
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:28 (7th ed. 2011). See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v.
Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).
176
“In construing § 7212(a) to require a pending IRS action under the code of which the
defendant is aware, we are also mindful that courts should interpret statutes that impose
criminal liability narrowly to ensure proper notice to the accused.” United States v. Kassouf,
144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998).
177
Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 682 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
172
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unambiguous as described below, does not apply in this situation. The
Supreme Court has required that the rule of lenity itself should be strictly
construed to situations where “after considering text, structure, history, and
purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.”178
Even if admitting, for argument’s sake, that the Sixth Circuit outlier opinions
demonstrate some textual ambiguity, there is little-to-no basis whatsoever on
which to conclude that the ambiguity is “grievous.”179 This point was driven
home during the Marinello oral argument, when Justice Kagan challenged
the use of the rule of lenity and at one point speculated that the nexus
requirement came “out of thin air.”180
One Supreme Court decision is illustrative in that it declined to apply
the rule of lenity to a different statute that was seemingly even more
ambiguous than § 7212(a). In the case of Reno v. Koray, a prison inmate
argued that the definition of “official detention” within the Bail Reform Act
of 1984181 included time spent at a treatment center during bail release.182 A
split existed among federal circuit courts as to whether time spent at a
treatment center counted as “official detention” time and the prisoner, Ziya
Koray, argued that this disagreement should be viewed as ambiguity that
warranted use of the rule of lenity in reducing the length of his sentence.183
The Court denied use of the rule, stating “[t]he rule of lenity applies only if,
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more
than a guess as to what Congress intended.”184 The Court was unconvinced
that a split of authority created such ambiguity.185 Ambiguity that exists
within § 7212(a), if any, is comparable to that in Reno because courts don’t
have definitive evidence of what Congress intended as evidenced by the
circuit split. Similar to the legal landscape in Reno, after Kassouf was
decided, “the overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeals”186 decided
178

Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 488 (2010) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis

added).
179

Grievous, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/grievous (last visited February 18, 2017) (defining “grievous” as
“causing or characterized by severe pain, suffering, or sorrow”).
180
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, 22, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S.
argued Dec. 6, 2017), 2017 WL 6040470.
181
Pub. L. 98-473, Tit. II, ch. I, 98 Stat. 1976. The referenced language was codified in
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2001).
182
515 U.S. 50, 53 (1995).
183
Id. at 64.
184
Id. at 65 (internal quotations omitted).
185
Id. at 64–65 (“A statute is not ‘ambiguous’ for purposes of lenity merely because
there is a division of judicial authority over its proper construction.”) (internal quotations
omitted).
186
Id. at 53.
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not to interpret the statute in the defendant-friendly way.187 Therefore, lenity
is not appropriate in this context.
4. The Legislative History is Not Helpful
Some might argue that where ambiguity exists, courts must attempt to
interpret legislative intent by looking to the legislative history. Despite the
fact that legislative history often provides little value,188 as previously noted,
there is scant legislative history to look to in attempting to decipher the scope
and reach of § 7212(a).189 Some, however, have argued that the § 7212(a)
House and Senate Reports showed intent to cabin § 7212(a) towards actions
against “specific IRS agents or investigations.”190 However, a more
convincing interpretation of the House and Senate Reports is that they
contain no instruction whatsoever on the omnibus clause.191 It is more
persuasive that the reports omit any intent towards the omnibus clause
whatsoever because the language from the Senate Report (corresponding
with the version that was adopted) which is claimed to be instructive on the
omnibus clause, only makes mention of “intimidation or impeding” and does
not refer to the “in any other way” language of the omnibus clause.192 To
187
See supra Section II.B.1 (describing how the majority of circuit courts have denied
implementing the Kassouf nexus test).
188
Justice Jackson provided an apt criticism of legislative history:
When	
   we	
   decide	
   from	
   legislative	
   history,	
   including	
   statements	
   of	
   witnesses	
   at	
  
hearings,	
  what	
  Congress	
  probably	
  had	
  in	
  mind,	
  we	
  must	
  put	
  ourselves	
  in	
  the	
  place	
  
of	
  a	
  majority	
  of	
  Congressmen	
  and	
  act	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  impression	
  we	
  think	
  this	
  
history	
   should	
   have	
   made	
   on	
   them.	
   Never	
   having	
   been	
   a	
   Congressman,	
   I	
   am	
  
handicapped	
  in	
  that	
  weird	
  endeavor.	
  That	
  process	
  seems	
  to	
  me	
  not	
  interpretation	
  
of	
  a	
  statute	
  but	
  creation	
  of	
  a	
  statute.	
  

United States v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). See also Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 621(1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (disclaiming the value of Committee reports in determining
legislative intent).
189
See supra Section I.B.
190
Fink & Rule, supra note 8, at 357.
191
See Marrazzo, supra note 29, at 88; Townsend, supra note 34, at 284 n.107.
192
The report states:
Subsection	
   (a)	
   of	
   this	
   section,	
   relating	
   to	
   the	
   intimidation	
   or	
   impeding	
   of	
   any	
  
officer	
  or	
  employee	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
  acting	
  in	
  an	
  official	
  capacity	
  under	
   this	
  
title,	
   or	
   by	
   force	
   or	
   threat	
   of	
   force	
   attempting	
   to	
   obstruct	
   or	
   impede	
   the	
   due	
  
administration	
  of	
  this	
  title	
  is	
  new	
  in	
  part.	
  	
  This	
  section	
  provides	
  for	
  the	
  punishment	
  
of	
  threats	
  or	
  threatening	
  acts	
  against	
  agents	
  of	
  the	
  Internal	
  Revenue	
  Service,	
  or	
  
any	
  other	
  officer	
  or	
  employee	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States,	
  or	
  members	
  of	
  the	
  families	
  of	
  
such	
   persons,	
   on	
   account	
   of	
   the	
   performance	
   by	
   such	
   agents	
   or	
   officers	
   or	
  
employees	
   of	
   their	
   official	
   duties.	
   	
   This	
   section	
   will	
   also	
   punish	
   the	
   corrupt	
  
solicitation	
  of	
  an	
  internal	
  revenue	
  employee.	
  
S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 604 (1954).
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infer Congressional intent from one disjointed paragraph contained in a 1954
committee report which does not even quote the relevant language is to
stretch a legal argument beyond its logical bounds. The committee report
cannot be determinative as to legislative intent.
Even evidence of Congressional intent is unimportant when no textual
ambiguity exists within the language of a statute.193 Thus, it is not
problematic that Congress left little legislative history as guidance on how to
apply § 7212(a) because the statute is unambiguous. The § 7212(a) omnibus
clause punishes any individual who “in any other way corruptly or by force
or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication)
obstructs or impedes, or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due
administration of this title.”194 The disputed language, “due administration
of this title” and “corruptly . . . endeavors” nowhere requires knowledge of
an official proceeding as a prerequisite to violation of the statute. Adding a
nexus requirement presupposes ambiguity because of legislative intent of
which there is no evidence based on the plain language.
B. AGUILAR DOES NOT AND SHOULD NOT APPLY TO SECTION 7212(A)

1. Differences Between Section 1503(a) and Section 7212(a)
The crux of the Sixth Circuit argument that resulted in the § 7212(a)
nexus test is the comparison of the omnibus clauses in § 7212(a) and 18
U.S.C. § 1503(a).195 This comparison is problematic at best since § 7212(a)
and § 1503 are two very differently structured statutes, and the omnibus
clauses need to be structurally analyzed within their respective statutes. The
comparison could start and end with the statutes’ titles. Section 7212(a)
received the broad title “[a]ttempts to interfere with administration of internal
revenue laws” while § 1503’s title reads more specifically “[i]nfluencing or
injuring officer or juror generally.” The titles indicate what the text of the
statutes highlight, that § 7212 was written using much broader language than
§ 1503. In fact, § 1503 is one specific obstruction statute within a long list
of obstruction crimes in Title 18, while § 7212 was written to encompass any
obstruction of the entirety of Title 26.196 What is also interesting is that the
title of § 1503 indicates that it was meant to limit the statute to the very thing
193
“It is axiomatic that the starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself.” Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985)
(internal quotation omitted).
194
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (2012).
195
United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998).
196
See United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2010). The Wood court
convincingly expressed this argument in refusing to apply a nexus test. Id. (citing United
States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1541 (11th Cir. 1991)).
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that § 7212(a) was argued to have been intended to criminalize, acts against
“specific . . . agents or investigations.”197 Section 1503, at least from reading
its title, indicates an intention to specifically protect individuals (officers or
jurors). Section 7212’s title gives no such charge. Surely if Congress had
meant for § 7212 to replicate § 1503 in a tax setting, as the argument goes, it
would have given it a similar title, e.g., “attempts to interfere with IRS
officers or agents.”
Another glaring and important difference between the two statutes is the
inclusion of the phrase “in any other way” in the omnibus clause of § 7212(a),
which is omitted from § 1503(a). Inclusion of this phrase “does not seem to
add anything other than to emphasize the broad scope of the omnibus
clause.”198 Obstructing or impeding administration of the Internal Revenue
Code in any other way semantically includes every possible way one could
obstruct or impede that was not previously delineated in the statute. From
this, it is difficult to imagine that Congress could have chosen more
expansive language or intended a broader application.
Furthermore, as highlighted in Wood,199 § 1503 lists very specific
examples of activity that constitutes punishable behavior. For example, the
statute bans “endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit
juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States
magistrate judge or other committing magistrate.”200 It also covers an
individual who:
[I]njures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict
or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such juror,
or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate in his
201
person or property on account of the performance of his official duties.

These actions are much more specific than § 7212’s broad proscription
from acts affecting “due administration of this title.” The differences show
two different statutes, with two different meanings, which require two
different interpretations.
2. Interpretation by Comparing Statutes
It cannot be denied that when interpreting statutes, courts often look to

197
See supra Section III.A.4 (discussing an argument that Congress intended § 7212(a)
to be limited to acts against investigators or agents).
198
Townsend, supra note 34, at 284 n.107.
199
United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2010).
200
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012).
201
Id.
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potentially analogous statutes to try and find similar meaning.202 However,
the case of Bedrock Ltd., L.L.C. v. United States offers an example of the
limitations of this principle.203 In Bedrock, landowners who were attempting
to quiet title on land that was previously owned by the government, argued
for the interpretation of the term “valuable minerals” in the Pittman
Underground Water Act (PUWA) to be analogous to its interpretation of the
term “minerals” in another federal statute, the Stock–Raising Homestead Act
(SRHA).204 The court mentioned that the SHRA definition was useful in
interpreting the PUWA because of “contemporaneous enactment and
analogous purpose” but ultimately concluded that the absence of the term
“valuable” gave the statutes two different meanings.205 Bedrock concluded
what Kassouf denied, that two statutes that may appear to have similar
purposes cannot be interpreted identically where Congress did not mirror the
language in the two statutes. The difference in the titles between § 7212(a)
and § 1503(a) and the specificity existing in § 1503(a) that is absent from §
7212(a) shows more than a difference of a single word. It highlights a
purposeful distinction between the scope of the two statutes, much like the
term “valuable” gave the SRHA different meaning and different
interpretation than the PUWA.
Another argument against trying to compare § 7212(a) with other
statutes is that different comparisons can lead to conflicting outcomes. For
example, comparison to the crime known as the “Klein conspiracy”206 led
one court to conclude that no nexus requirement exists within the § 7212(a)
omnibus clause.207 United States v. Willner discussed how conviction of a
“Klein conspiracy” could be obtained from acts which often require no
knowledge of an ongoing investigation, such as “active concealment of
income by making false entries in books and records, submitting false
documents to the IRS, and taking other affirmative acts to impede and
obstruct the Treasury Department in the collection of income taxes.”208 The
court considered these acts which when committed by more than one person
constitute a “conspiracy to obstruct” to be comparable to obstruction under
202

See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) (“This
appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in the development of the law reflects
the practices of common-law courts from the most ancient times.”).
203
314 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2002).
204
Id. at 1088.
205
Id.
206
Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 271 in a tax context is known as a “Klein conspiracy,”
originating from United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S.
924 (1958). See Townsend, supra note 34, at 263 n.8.
207
United States v. Willner, No. 07 CR. 183, 2007 WL 2963711, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
11, 2007).
208
Id. at *5 (internal quotations omitted).
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the § 7212(a) omnibus clause, absent the requirement that more than one
person be involved.209 In making this comparison, the Willner court denied
application of a nexus requirement to the § 7212(a) omnibus clause.210
Section 7212(a) cannot be subject to both Aguilar’s and Willner’s holdings.
It should be interpreted independently.
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE
For the reasons articulated above, the Supreme Court should not adopt
the Kassouf nexus test to the § 7212(a) omnibus clause as written. However,
without some limiting principle, there is a risk that prosecutors will continue
to overuse the omnibus clause, charging a felony for conduct meant to be
punished as a misdemeanor.211 The Court should appropriately interpret the
statute as requiring prosecutors to prove an affirmative act for an omnibus
clause violation, but the Court’s action should end there. Congress, in its
lawmaking role, is the appropriate body to clean up the mess that is the
omnibus clause of § 7212(a). Congress should decide what role the omnibus
clause should play in future tax prosecutions and should change the language
of § 7212(a) to limit what is arguably an unconstitutionally vague statute.212
A. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD INTERPRET THE STATUTE AS
WRITTEN

Marinello presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to weigh in on
the debate about how broadly the omnibus clause should be construed. The
Court should perform its role in interpreting the statute according to
Congressional intent, regardless of policy arguments. The Court, unlikely to
cast the omnibus clause aside as unconstitutionally vague, is more likely to
save the statute through some limiting principle.213 As argued above at
length, the Kassouf nexus test should not be that principle. Rather, the Court
should look to the statutory scheme of tax crimes to limit omnibus clause
charges to taxpayers who have performed an affirmative act.
209

Id. at *6.
Id.
211
See Brief for American College of Tax Counsel as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 23–24, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S. filed Sept. 9, 2017), 2017
WL 4023122 (noting that failures to act under the tax code are typically misdemeanors and
that the “Government’s sweeping interpretation of § 7212(a) would make it an outlier in an
otherwise coherent tax enforcement system”).
212
See id. at 5 (arguing that the government’s interpretation of § 7212(a) would make
the statute unconstitutionally vague).
213
See U. S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S.
548, 571 (1973) (“As we see it, our task is not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it,
if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.”).
210
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Prior to Marinello, some in academia assumed that activity in violation
of the omnibus clause is limited to affirmative acts.214 This is perhaps
because, as the New York Council of Defense Lawyers so aptly described,
[i]n implementing Title 26, Congress sought to distinguish between acts of commission,
which could be charged as felonies, and failures to act, which were deemed to merit
misdemeanor charges. With the exception of two well-defined and limited situations
involving taxpayers performing special roles, neither of which applies in [the
Marinello] case or the overwhelming majority of Section 7212(a) cases, tax felonies
215
require willful commission of an affirmative act.

Furthermore, courts should interpret statutes enacted as a part of a
statutory scheme as having the same meaning as other statutes within that
scheme.216 For this reason, the Court in Marinello, should assume Congress
meant the omnibus clause of § 7212(a), a felony charge, to punish affirmative
acts only and not omissions. This limitation, which would likely result in the
remand of Marinello,217 is the only limit that can be provided from a strict
interpretation of the statute.
B. CONGRESS SHOULD RETHINK THE ROLE OF THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE

Congress, having enacted an overly broad and potentially
unconstitutional criminal felony statute, which has deprived and will
continue to deprive individuals of their liberty, should hold hearings to
determine what conduct it meant to be punished under the omnibus clause.
In doing so, it should consider the plethora of case law, briefs, articles, and
other resources that have considered this crime and the role it should play
among other criminal provisions. Congress may even want to argue whether
an omnibus clause in § 7212(a) is necessary at all, given the numerous other
criminal tax provisions within Title 26 and other obstruction charges within
Title 18. Regardless of the answer to these questions, Congress is the only
appropriate channel through which these decisions should be made. And
given the stakes, it should act expediently.

214

See, e.g., JOHN A. TOWNSEND ET AL., TAX CRIMES 92 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 2d.
ed. 2015) (stating “affirmative action must be taken” to meet the “endeavoring” element of
the omnibus clause).
215
Brief for New York Council of Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 10, Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (U.S. filed Sept. 8, 2017), 2017 WL
4023121.
216
See generally 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.2 (7th ed. 2012) (explaining how statutes should be
interpreted by reference to related statutes).
217
Marinello arguably committed affirmative acts that may have violated the omnibus
clause, such as destroying records, paying employees with cash, and transferring assets.
United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 2016).
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C. EASY AND SIMPLE CHANGES TO THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE ARE
NECESSARY

One very simple and necessary change should be made to § 7212(a).
“Willfully” should be substituted for “corruptly.” This change would
eliminate the confusion as to whether an individual has to have knowledge
of an illegal act or broad knowledge of some unlawful gain from his or her
act.218 It is unclear why Congress included the lesser “corruptly” mens rea
standard, but it was probably a result of mirroring the language from other
obstruction statutes.219 Congress should consider whether a relaxed mens rea
standard serves any purpose at all in the prosecution of this obstruction crime,
and it should inevitably conclude that taxpayers and law enforcement alike
would benefit from a more certain standard.
Congress should also consider whether the omnibus clause should be
limited to punishing activity that obstructed a pending investigation or
proceeding, a conclusion that is far from foregone. In doing so, it should pay
particular attention to Bowman, a case where the Sixth Circuit seemed so
eager to punish the defendant under the omnibus clause, that it stretched to
limit its binding decision in Kassouf.220 Bowman is particularly relevant to
this decision because it adds the nuance of what punishment is appropriate
for a taxpayer who attempts to obstruct an anticipated but not yet realized
investigation.221 If Congress decides that the crime should contain a nexus
requirement, it has only to substitute one word within the statute for another:
“enforcement” for “administration.” As discussed earlier, this would
appropriately limit prosecutors to punishing acts that obstruct or impede
solely the enforcement function of the IRS.
CONCLUSION
The Kassouf and Miner opinions have created confusion about the
meaning of the omnibus clause of § 7212 within the Sixth Circuit and outside
of it. Kassouf was wrongly decided on many fronts when it applied bad
precedent to a statute that had clear words with plain meaning. Miner
perpetuated the problem created by Kassouf by offering conjecture on an
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See supra Section I.D.
See Townsend, supra note 34, at 283 (concluding that “[w]hen § 7212 was enacted in
1954, it had some predicates in the prior tax law criminalizing forcible conduct to influence
tax administration, but § 7212 was drawn virtually verbatim from the general obstruction
provisions in the criminal code”).
220
See United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that
“Kassouf must be limited to its precise holding and facts”).
221
Id. (explaining that Bowman’s illegal act was done “for the purpose of causing the
IRS to initiate action against a taxpayer”).
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issue that was not dispositive to its parties. And in exchange for this statutory
uncertainty, all that the Sixth Circuit seems to have achieved are a handful of
dismissed complaints with one notable overturned conviction.222
The Supreme Court should reject Kassouf’s nexus test. In doing so, the
Court should consider the weight of all the precedent in disagreement with
Kassouf and it should apply the statute according to its very plain meaning.
On the other hand, the Court should look to the statutory scheme of Title 26
and limit the omnibus clause from punishing omissions by requiring some
affirmative act. Any other omnibus clause limitations that are necessary
should come from Congress, after lengthy debate about how an omnibus
clause to § 7212(a) fits into the statutory scheme. Congress can make
meaningful change to the omnibus clause through very minor adjustments to
the statutory language.
Because this crime can result in serious
consequences, Congress should act fast in order to put taxpayers on notice of
what acts might result in a potential felony charge.
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Note that Kassouf’s conviction was overturned but Miner’s was not. See supra
Section II.C (noting that the Miner holding was not dispositive).

